Motivated by the rise of social media platforms that achieve a fusion of content and community, we consider the role of word-of-mouth communications (WOM) structured through a network. Using a data set from YouTube, we examine how cascades of WOM interactions enhance the popularity of videos. We first estimate the impact of channel influence and other network parameters in initiating WOM communications. The probit estimation considers the selection effect in videos that are likely to be associated with a greater propensity to trigger WOM. We find that factors related to a channel's ability to be a connector and a translator is most likely to result in the incidence of WOM. We then examine how cascades of WOM conversations have persistent impacts on subsequent video popularity. Empirically, the main issue here is heterogeneity in the epidemic potential of a video. Since the threshold might vary across videos, we use a finite mixture model. We also conduct a simultaneous estimation using latent instrumental variables to address endogeneity from unobservables. Our research has implications for researchers and practitioners by highlighting how WOM travels through networks of influence and susceptibility in disseminating awareness, and holds insights in regard to designing social recommendation systems and identifying trending topics in social media. > >
This paper presents new evidence on the role of embeddedness in predicting contract duration in the context of information technology outsourcing. Contract duration is a strategic decision that aligns interests of clients and vendors, providing the benefits of business continuity to clients and incentives to undertake relationship specific investments for vendors. Considering the salience of this phenomenon, there has been limited empirical scrutiny of how contract duration is awarded. We posit that clients and vendors obtain two benefits from being embedded in an interorganizational network. First, the learning and experience accumulated from being embedded in a client-vendor network could mitigate the challenges in managing longer term contracts. Second, the network serves as a reputation system that can stratify vendors according to their trustworthiness and reliability, which is important in longer term arrangements. In particular, we attempt to make a substantive contribution to the literature by theorizing about embeddedness at four distinct levels: structural embeddedness at the node level, relational embeddedness at the dyad level, contractual embeddedness at the level of a neighborhood of contracts, and finally, positional embeddedness at the level of the entire network. We analyze a data set of 22,039 outsourcing contracts implemented between 1989 and 2008. We find that contract duration is indeed associated with structural and positional embeddedness of participant firms, with the relational embeddedness of the buyer-seller dyad, and with the duration of other contracts to which it is connected through common firms. Given the nature of our data, identification using traditional ordinary least squares based approaches is difficult given the unobserved errors clustered along two nonnested dimensions and the autocorrelation in a firm's decision (here the contract) with those of contracts in its reference group. We use a multiway cluster robust estimation and a network auto-regressive estimation to address these issues. Implications for literature and practice are discussed.
This paper is motivated by the success of YouTube, which is attractive to content creators as well as corporations for its potential to rapidly disseminate digital content. The networked structure of interactions on YouTube and the tremendous variation in the success of videos posted online lends itself to an inquiry of the role of social influence. Using a unique data set of video information and user information collected from YouTube, we find that social interactions are influential not only in determining which videos become successful but also on the magnitude of that impact. We also find evidence for a number of mechanisms by which social influence is transmitted, such as (i) a preference for conformity and homophily and (ii) the role of social networks in guiding opinion formation and directing product search and discovery. Econometrically, the problem in identifying social influence is that individuals' choices depend in great part upon the choices of other individuals, referred to as the reflection problem. Another problem in identification is to distinguish between social contagion and user heterogeneity in the diffusion process. Our results are in sharp contrast to earlier models of diffusion, such as the Bass model, that do not distinguish between different social processes that are responsible for the process of diffusion. Our results are robust to potential self-selection according to user tastes, temporal heterogeneity and the reflection problem. Implications for researchers and managers are discussed.
Application service providers (ASP), who host and maintain information technology (IT) applications across the Internet, emerged as an innovation in the way IT services are delivered to client firms. In spite of many potential benefits of this model, ASPs experienced business failure and high rates of exit. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that the efficiency of contracting arrangements between ASPs and client organizations is an important determinant of ASP survival. We test this prediction using a unique data set combining multiple sources that allows us to track an ASP from the year of founding through the beginning of 2006. Contractual misalignment, or adopting contracts mismatched with the underlying agency costs, significantly lowers the probability of survival of service providers in the ASP marketplace. The impact of misalignment is particularly severe when coupled with adjustment costs that impede the transition to aligned contracts. To account for potential heterogeneity in ASPs' knowledge of contracting, we test for endogenous self-selection of ASPs in the relationship between contractual misalignment and survival. Our results are robust to a variety of model specifications as well as alternate explanations of survival from multiple theoretical domains.
The complexity and scope of outsourced information technology (IT) demands relationship-specific investments from vendors, which, when combined with contract incompleteness, may result in underinvestment and inefficient bargaining, referred to as the holdup problem. Using a unique data set of over 100 IT outsourcing contracts, we examine whether contract extensiveness, i.e., the extent to which firms and vendors can foresee contingencies when designing contracts for outsourced IT services, can alleviate holdup. While extensively detailed contracts are likely to include a greater breadth of activities outsourced to a vendor, task complexity makes it difficult to draft extensive contracts. Furthermore, extensive contracts may still be incomplete with respect to enforcement. We then examine the role of nonprice contractual provisions, contract duration, and extendibility terms, which give firms an option to extend the contract to limit the likelihood of holdup. We also validate the ex post efficiency of contract design choices by examining renewals of contracting agreements.
We examine contract choices in the provision of "software-as-a-service" (SaaS), which is a business innovation that transforms information technology (IT) resources into a continuously provided service. We draw upon agency theory and modularity theory to propose that one of the central challenges in service disaggregation is that of knowledge interdependencies across client and provider organizations. The resulting lack of verifiability of certain tasks results in a multitask agency problem. Our key research questions involve (1) the suitability of high- versus low-powered incentives in SaaS contracts when the outsourced tasks involve business analytics that are difficult to verify, and (2) how such contract choices are affected by the modularity of interfaces between the client and the provider. Analysis of data collected from 154 providers of SaaS offering a range of IT services supports our contention that when contracting for business analytics characterized by knowledge interdependencies across clients and providers, incentives should be "low powered." Modularity in the interfaces of the service provider increases the desirability of high-powered incentives in such situations. Our results are robust after accounting for endogeneity issues arising from unobserved matching between service providers and the nature of IT services outsourced by clients. With the increasing importance of information systems in services, this paper suggests that arm's-length relationships and high-powered incentives may be ineffective in incentivizing providers to perform on complex business analytic tasks, unless accompanied by the modularization of interfaces.
Application service providers (ASP), which host and maintain information technology (IT) applications across the Internet, offer an alternative to traditional models of IT service for user firms. We build on prior literature in transaction cost economics (TCE) to argue that the contract design should address ex post transaction costs that result due to contractual incompleteness and opportunism. We argue that contract design is multidimensional, and that it is necessary to design governance structures that can protect user firms from shirking and monitoring costs, as well as provide for efficient adaptation when requirements are incompletely specified at the start of the initiative. Our empirical analysis suggests that factors such as uncertainty in specifying service requirements, interdependence between the ASP application and IT systems in the client organization, and the need for specific investments favor time and materials contracts, whereas fixed prices are desirable when strong incentives are needed for cost reduction. We also find that contracts that are aligned with transaction attributes in a transaction cost--economizing manner are significantly less likely to experience budget overruns and realize better ex post performance than those that are not. These results hold normative implications for both user and provider firms to assess the performance implications of choosing contracts in line with prescriptions of TCE.
In spite of the promise and potential of improving the way organizations develop, operate and maintain information technology (IT) applications, application service providers (ASPs) have fared poorly in terms of attracting a large client base. Anecdotal evidence in the business press points to limited satisfaction among users of ASP, which calls for an assessment of determinants of satisfaction with ASP. In this paper, we draw upon the consumer satisfaction paradigm widely employed in marketing literature to analyze post-usage satisfaction with ASP services. We develop a conceptual model of satisfaction with ASP and empirically test the predictions using data from 256 firms using ASP services. Expectations about ASP service have a significant influence on the performance evaluation of ASPs, and experience-based norms have only limited significance in explaining satisfaction with ASP. We also find empirical support for the influence of performance and disconfirmation on the satisfaction with ASP. Implications for both ASPs and organizations adopting ASP services are discussed.